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COMMENTS
AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE SPENDING
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

ETHAN FENNt

INTRODUCTION TO THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEBATE

Major elections roll around every two years, and with them the issue of
campaign finance. While courts are in a rough consensus on what sorts of campaign finance restrictions are permissible, many jurists, commentators, and political activists seem unsatisfied with that consensus, suggesting that a new approach may be called for. Central to the permissibility of campaign finance restrictions is the extent to which campaign expenditures and donations are protected political speech under the First Amendment. Courts now hold that expenditures are protected speech, but that contributions are not. However, there
are many calls to make the treatment of the two consistent by ruling either that
both are speech or neither one is.
Economic theories of advertising suggest that political advertising is likely to
be the sort of advertising that has specific informational (as opposed to mere
recognition-building) content. On this ground, political campaigns have a strong
claim to the status of political speech and to First Amendment protection.
Courts have recognized that the presence of a substantive message is a key determinant of whether something counts as speech under the First Amendment.
In particular, theories about the presence or absence of an overall substantive
t Ethan Fenn is aJ.D. candidate at the University of Chicago Law School and a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Chicago. He received his B.A. from Wesleyan University in 1993 and A.M. in
Economics from the University of Chicago in 2000.
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message in advertising seem to have been important in the Court's historical
treatment of commercial speech as a whole.
Purely economic arguments agree with the legal ones, in that the more candidates tend to have informational advertising, the more likely it is that unlimited campaign spending is economically efficient.
THE LAW OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Since Buckley v Valeo,' courts have consistently ruled that limits on individuals' campaign contributions are generally permissible while limits on candidates'
total campaign expenditures, or on independent issue-related advertising, are
not. The logic behind disallowing expenditure limits is that political campaigns
(whether of candidates for office or of independent groups concerned with particular issues) constitute political speech and therefore enjoy "exacting" First
Amendment protection. 2 Contributions, on the other hand, only tenuously raise
speech issues, and contribution restrictions are generally upheld on the grounds
3
that they are narrowly tailored to combat corruption.
While final rulings have consistently upheld these expenditure and contribution principles from Buckly,4 there have been numerous concurring and dissenting opinions expressing dissatisfaction with them. In general, these opinions
have found the classification of expenditures as speech but contributions as
non-speech to be artificial. However, some would classify both expenditures and
5
contributions as speech and thus entitled to strict First Amendment protection,
while others would classify both expenditures and contributions as non-speech,
6
subjecting them to greater limitations.
With so much judicial dissatisfaction, the Buckley principles may be ripe for
revision. Indeed, in the Supreme Court's most recent look at the issue, a major7
ity of the Justices indicated at least a possible willingness to overrule Buckley.
Legislatures have also been reluctant to accept the principles of Buckley. Several

1. 424 US 1 (1976).
2. Id at 14-23, 44.
3. See id at 23-29.
4. Some Supreme Court decisions affirming, but refining, Buckly are: Nixon v Shink Mo Gov't
PAC, 528 US 377, 120 S Ct 897 (2000) (affirming contribution limits); Colorado Republican Fed Campaign
Comm v FEC, 518 US 604, 608 (1996) (affirming prohibition of limits on independent party expenditures);
FEC v Massachusetts CiiZensfor Life, Inc, 479 US 238, 263-64 (1986) (affirming prohibition on independent
expenditure limits as applied to corporations); FEC v National Conservative PAC, 470 US 480, 501 (1985)
(affirming prohibition of independent expenditure limits); California Med Assn v FEC, 453 US 182, 200-01

(1981) (no equal protection violation if contribution limits imposed on individuals but not unions or corporations).

5.

See, for example, Nixon v Shink Mo Gov't PAC, 120 S Ct 897, 916-27 (Thomas dissenting).

6.

See, for example, id at 910 (Stevens concurring); id at 910-11 (Breyer concurring).

7.

See id at 914 (Breyer joined by Ginsburg concurring); id at 916 (Kennedy dissenting); id at 916

(Thomas joined by Scalia dissenting).
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states purport to limit campaign expenditures in spite of its holding.8 This can
only add to the pressure to revisit Buckley.
LEGAL ACADEMIC CRmcIsM OF BUCKLEY
Academics have also expressed dissatisfaction with Buckly, and as their
criticisms mount so does the likelihood that the decision will be overruled.
Stephen Gottlieb, for instance, points out that Bucky explicitly rejects equality
of political participation as a First Amendment goal but implicitly embraces it by
upholding contribution limits.9 Although Buckly purports to define the First
Amendment as establishing a system of negative rights protecting individuals
from outside interference with their speech, its upholding of contribution limits
is said to acknowledge that the Amendment also embraces a system of positive
rights to equal participation in the political system.10 Although the stated rationale for contribution limits is fighting corruption, Gottlieb argues that the ultimate purpose of fighting corruption is to allow equal access to the political
process.'" Gottlieb seems to ignore the possibility that if the ideal contemplated
by the First Amendment is one of somewhat unequal political access, corruption
in favor of an egalitarian end is as much to be feared as elitist corruption.
William P. Marshall, noting that "[t]he Buckley opinion has satisfied virtually
no one," also points out the inconsistency of Buckles treatment of the equality
issue 12 and adds that the distinction between expenditures and contributions is
problematic for several reasons. First, the Buckly Court started out by describing
both contributions and expenditures as subject to the First Amendment, but
later seemed to abandon this position.13 Second, the Court underestimated the
expressive content of contributions. Contributions do express messages from
donors and they create indirect speech by the donors, so they should be equally
entitled to First Amendment protection as speech; beyond that, they embody
political association and should enjoy some First Amendment protection simply
for that reason.14 Third, the anticorruption rationale for allowing contribution
limits is belied by the disallowance of independent expenditure limits. Since corruption appears to be virtually as possible through independent expenditures as

8. See The Book ofthe States: 2000-01 211-27 (Council of State Governments 2000) (Vermont and
New Jersey laws purport to limit spending even without public financing).
9. Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma ofElection Camaign FinanceRefom, 18 Hofstra L Rev 213, 229

(Fall 1989).
10. See id.
11. Seeid.
12. William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chancefor Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw U L Rev 335, 349
(Wmter 2000).
13. Id at 350, citing Buckly, 424 US at 14 (perhaps referring to the following text in footnote 93:
"The Act's contribution and expenditure limits operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.').
14.

Marshall, 94 Nw U L Rev at 350-51.
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through direct contributions, the anticorruption rationale used to uphold contribution limits could also be used to uphold limits on independent expenditures."
(This criticism interacts with the first. To the extent that the anticorruption rationale cannot sustain limits on contributions, contributions must be pushed
into an unprotected category in order to uphold their limitation.) Fourth, expenditures and contributions are so linked in practice that any arguments that
apply to one should apply to the other. If expenditures are protected because
they are necessary for political speech, then contributions should be protected
because they are necessary for expenditures. On the other side, if contributions
should be limited to fight corruption, then limiting expenditures might also be
valid on the grounds that it would reduce the demand for contributions.' 6
Burt Neuborne concurs in criticizing both the rejection of an equality rationale and the expenditure-contribution distinction, and tacks on the criticism
that a one-to-one correlation of money to speech does not exist at high expenditure levels.' 7 Neubome's implicit theory seems to be one of saturation, in which
there is some amount of campaigning after which the public becomes completely aware of a candidate's message and expenditures serve no further informational purpose.' 8 Laurence Tribe writes, 'While this [expenditurecontribution] distinction has always seemed problematic, it should by now have
become clear that it is ripe for complete reassessment by the Court."' 9 Tribe
argues that the anticorruption rationale applies equally to expenditures and contributions 20 and that since the same First Amendment balancing applies to both,
21
they should both be limitable.
On the other side of the issue, Federal Election Commissioner Bradley A.
Smith calls Buck/y "one of the most widely scorned decisions in the recent history of the Court."22 Smith notes three criticisms of Buckley from the prospending-limit literature: its basic equation of money and speech, its narrow
15. Idat 351.
16. Id at 351.
17. Burt Neuborne, Buckley's AnafyticalFlaws, 6J L & Policy 111, 115-17 (1997).
18. Neuborne offers no explicit model behind this theory, but one that might support it is discussed
in Ethan Fenn, The Poliy Effects of Campaign Spending Limits 12-13 (2001) (unpublished PhD dissertation
draft, University of Chicago) (on file with author). In a variant of an Exogenous Mixed Model, there may
be a fixed set of voters reachable by informative advertising. Once all those voters are reached, all expenditures must be directed toward the remaining voters, who are only amenable to persuasive advertising with
no informational content. As discussed below, the informational advertising correlates strongly with
speech, while the persuasive advertising does not.
19. Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 1145 (Foundation 2d ed 1988). The second edition of American ConstitutionalLawwas a single volume. Only the first volume of a two-volume third edition
has appeared, and it does not cover the section quoted.
20. Id at 1145 n 16, citing Ray Forrester, The New ConstitntionalRight to Buj Elecions, 69 ABA J 1078,

1080 (Aug1983).
21. Tribe, ConstitutionalLaw at1145 n 17, citing FEC v NationalConservative PAC, 470 US at 519-20
(Marshall dissenting) (cited in note 19).
22. Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Cormption, Equali, and Campaign Finance, 86 Geo L J 45,
46 (Oct 1997).

2001]

An Economic View of Campaign FinanceSpending 177

definition of corruption as a quid pro quo exchange, and its rejection of a First
Amendment egalitarian purpose 2 3 However, he argues that "the most doctrinally suspect portion of the decision is that upholding contribution limits." 24
Smith criticizes the upholding of contribution limits for three reasons: First,
contributions constitute indirect speech by donors; such indirect speech is usually protected in other contexts, such as when attorneys speak for their clients or
spokespersons speak for corporations. 25 Second, there is little evidence of corruption to justify contribution limits; rather, studies show that the most important determinants of legislative behavior are personal ideology, party affiliation,
and constituent interests.2 6 Finally, there is insufficient tailoring of the contribution limits to whatever corruption may exist, and the most narrowly tailored
alternative is required by the strict scrutiny standard applicable to campaign
speech. 27 Disclosure of contributors is a more narrowly tailored alternative to
fighting corruption, since voters can then determine which candidates are ac28
cepting quid pro quo contributions and vote against them.
AN EcoNoMIc APPROACH TO CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
THE GENERAL ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING
Economic theory naturally has a good deal to say about advertising. Economic theories of advertising can be applied to the particular case of political
campaign advertising and used to answer the question of whether there is any
substantive political speech within campaign advertising that merits First
Amendment protection.
The classic economic literature on advertising argues that advertised products and services fall into two basic categories: information goods and experience goods. Information goods are those about which a consumer can, by simply being told about the good's characteristics, acquire a sufficient understanding
to decide whether to purchase the good. A good example is a personal computer. Advertising can tell a consumer a computer's hard drive capacity, CPU

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at 47.
at 63.
at 57-58.
at 58-59. Smith, in note 92, cites Stephanie D. Moussali, Campaign FinanceReform: The Caefor

Deregulation6 Games Madison Institute 1990); Frank J. Sorauf, Money in American Elections316 (Scott Fores-

man 1988); Janet Grenzke, PACs and the CongreusionalSupermarket.The Curreny isCo)plex, 33 Am J Pol Sci 1,
1 (1989); Larry Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruptonin Campagn Financing,in A. James Reichley, ed, Elections

American Syle 155, 160 (Brookings 1987); W.P. Welch, Campagn Contributions and Legislatv

Voting: Milk

Mon and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W Pol Q 478, 479 (1982); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance
Reform: The Root ofAllEvills Deepyl Rooted, 18 Hofstra L Rev 301 (1989) (criticizing the previous studies).
27. Smith, 86 Geo LJ at 61 n 109, citing cases (cited in note 22).
28. Id at 61.
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speed, memory, monitor size, included peripherals, and other technical
specifications; there is little else that the consumer needs to know in order to
decide whether or not to buy the computer. Experience goods, on the other
hand, must actually be used by the consumer before he acquires an understanding of their characteristics. 29 A typical example would be a can of soda. Consumers will decide whether or not to buy it based solely on its taste, but a consumer
cannot determine the soda's taste until he has actually drunk the soda. In reality,
most goods have some particular characteristics that can be communicated verbally and other characteristics that must be experienced. For instance, one can
describe verbally a car's engine capacity and type, horsepower, and gas mileage,
but not the firmness of its suspension and handling. However, the division into
distinct groups of goods still serves as a useful first approximation and as an aid
to understanding the factors behind the spectrum of experience and information
characteristics.
Advertising for each of the two types of goods is thought to operate by very
different processes. For information goods, advertising can convey the characteristics of the good that are necessary for consumers to make purchasing decisions. In other words, it conveys a factual message about the product, allowing
consumers to make informed decisions based on that message. For experience
goods, however, advertising cannot convey such a message. Advertising is
thought to be effective for experience goods for two reasons: First, it jogs the
memory of consumers that have used the good before. Second, consumers surmise that, if they try the good, dislike it, and purchase no more of it, the good's
producer will lose money on its advertising. The producer would thus only advertise a product of high quality. Nevertheless, the advertising itself contains no
30
substantive information.
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING
Courts have not yet applied the economics of advertising to the First
Amendment context. However, courts and commentators have seen its importance in other areas, and there are several strains of First Amendment law that
suggest that it should apply here as well.
The biggest area of law to see an application of the economics of advertising is the law of false advertising and unfair competition, where economic arguments can be applied to suggest what sorts of goods are most likely to be the
objects of false advertising. 31 The argument runs as follows: For information
goods, the characteristics described in a good's advertising can be observed by

29.
30.
31.

See Phillip Nelson, Information andConsumerBehavior,78J Pol Econ 311, 312 (1970).
See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82J Pol Econ 729 (1974).
For this entire argument, see generally Edmund W. Kitch and Harvey S. Perlman, Intellectnal

Propery and Unfair Competition 57-64 (Foundation 5th ed 1998).
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consumers before they make a purchase. False advertisements can thus be disproved before they garner any sales, and firms should thus have little incentive
to run them. One should thus be skeptical ex ante about false advertising or
unfair competition claims about such goods.
A similar argument can be made about experience goods that tend to be
purchased repeatedly. A false advertisement might generate one sale per customer, but after that initial purchase, the customer will see that the claim was
false and make no more purchases. One should thus be almost, but not quite, as
skeptical of false advertising claims for repeat-purchase experience goods as for
information goods.
On the other hand, if an experience good is not the type that is purchased
repeatedly (or is such that a consumer might not discover its characteristics even
after a purchase-this subclass is sometimes called "credence goods"), a false
advertisement may generate only the one sale per customer that the advertiser is
seeking in the first place. It is inconsequential if the falsity of the advertisement
is discovered after purchase because the advertiser would have made no more
sales anyway. One should thus be more credulous about false advertising claims
for single-purchase experience goods.
One case utilizing this reasoning was Dr.Seuss Entqprises,LP v Penguin Books
USA, Inc.32 The plaintiff produced the popular, wholesome children's book The
Cat in the Hat, and sued for trademark infringement when the defendant published a parody in a similar style. The parody was titled The CatNot in the Hat!A
Parody by Dr.Juice and dramatized the crimes popularly attributed to O.J. Simpson.33 In determining the likelihood that consumers would be confused by the
parody, the court looked at (among many other factors) the status of books as
information or experience goods. It concluded that because books are an intermediate case, in which consumers typically ascertain some, but not all, of a
book's contents before reading it, the level of confusion arising from the similar
appearance of the books was indeterminate. 34
In CaliforniaDentalAssn v FTC, the Federal Trade Commission challenged
on antitrust grounds the advertising restrictions that the California Dental Association placed on its member dentists. 35 In evaluating whether the challenged
advertising restrictiohs were anticompetitive, the Ninth Circuit had to consider
one of the association's proffered justifications for the restrictions: that they
helped prevent misleading advertising. The court looked at dentistry's information and experience good characteristics in determining the likelihood that false
advertising would be a problem in the dental industry. It concluded that dentistry was a repeat-purchase experience good. Such goods normally are thought

32.
33.
34.
35.

924 F Supp 1559 (SD Cal 1996).
Id at 1561-62.
Id at 1571.
224 F3d 942, 944-45 (9th Cir 2000).
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to be minimally susceptible to false advertising because a firm will lose customers if an initial purchase reveals the firm's advertising to be false. In this case,
however, the court found that, since patients tend to be more loyal to dentists
than customers in other industries are, the possibility of attracting repeat business might induce some false advertising. The theory of information and experience goods thus had an uncertain implication for the validity of the dental association's restrictions, but looking at all other factors, the court found the restric36
tions to be pro-competitive and upheld them.
In the First Amendment context, courts have not looked to the economics
of advertising for guidance, but they have looked at other factors that suggest
that the degree of informational content in purported speech is important to
determining the level of First Amendment protection. One such instance is the
"particularized message" criterion enunciated in Spence v Washington.37 In that
famous case, Spence was prosecuted for displaying upside down in his window a
U.S. flag to which he had affixed a peace symbol made of adhesive tape.38
Spence intended to protest the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent
State University,39 and the Court found that the timing and context of his display made that intent clear to those who viewed the flag.40 The Court found that
a "particularized message" was present and that this classified the flag display as
41
speech rather than conduct.
Looking to the economics of advertising, it is clear that advertising for information goods will contain more of a "particularized message" than will advertising for experience goods. Information good advertising can convey specific statements about the product's characteristics, while experience good advertising cannot. By definition, it is impossible to give a specific description of
an experience good's relevant characteristics, so advertisements for such a good
must necessarily consist of general images conveying only the fact that the
product's producer is advertising. Advertising for information goods should
thus be more eligible for First Amendment protection under the "particularized
message" criterion.
Another area where courts have recognized informational content as critical
in distinguishing speech from non-speech is the treatment of commercial
speech. When the Supreme Court first decided that advertising was not entitled
to First Amendment protection, a major part of its logic was the belief that advertising had no informational content. The case that first explicitly excluded
commercial advertising from the First Amendment was Valentine v Cbrestensen,42
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

This entire line of reasoning is discussed in California DentalAssn, 224 F3d at 953.
418 US 405, 410-11 (1974).
Id at 406.
Id at 408.
Id at 410-11.
Id.
316 US 52, 54 (1942).
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which upheld a New York City ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills but allowing distribution of political handbills. Chrestensen
brought a touring exhibition based on a working submarine to New York City
and attempted to dock the submarine at a city pier. The city refused permission,
so he docked outside the city and began circulating advertising handbills within
the city. When city authorities forbade this based on the ordinance, Chrestensen
began circulating revised handbills containing on one side the original advertisement and on the other side a political protest against the city's refusal to allow the submarine to dock. Chrestensen won at trial and on appeal to the Second Circuit. In overruling the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court stated:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise
of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and
that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege

in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in
no
these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
43
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.

The Court thus set up a dichotomy between speech containing information or
opinion and commercial speech. Implicitly, commercial speech then contains
neither information nor opinion.
By contrast, consider the case where the Court reversed itself, extending
First Amendment protection to commercial speech. In Vi;Zinia State Bd of Pharmary v Virginia Cilizens Consumer Coundl,Inc, 4 a consumer advocacy group sued
the state pharmacy board over the board's policy of prohibiting price advertising
by pharmacists. The grounds for the suit were that the prohibition against price
advertising discouraged price competition, thereby raising prices for consumers.
The Court sided with the consumer group, making a broad holding that extended First Amendment protection to commercial advertising. Part of the
Court's reasoning was that "[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price." 45 The
belief in advertising's informational content has thus been critical in the Court's
assessment of its First Amendment merit.
INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC VIEWS OF ADVERTISING ON THE COURTS
It should be noted here that the Supreme Court's historical views about advertising have parallelled views in the economic literature. In the 1940s, the
dominant economic theory of advertising was that it simply acted by a more or
43. Id at 54.
44. 425 US 748 (1976).
45. Id at 765.
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less mysterious mechanism to alter consumers' underlying tastes in favor of the
advertised product. No information was thought to be at issue; there was a direct spur of demand for the goods. On the other hand, by the 1970s, Nelson's
(and similar) theories were in circulation, holding that commercial advertising
does contain a message. (The message is explicitly about the product's characteristics for information goods and implicitly about the advertiser's confidence in
the product for experience goods.) It is even possible to trace with some specificity how this economic reasoning has influenced courts.
In the 1940s, the dominant economic view of advertising was that put forth
by Edward Chamberlin. 46 As the title The Theoy of Monopolisic Competition suggests, Chamberlin's main argument was that cases of pure competition or pure
monopoly are rare. Most firms can, like classical monopolists, raise (or respectively, lower) their prices without driving their sales to zero (or respectively, infinity). However, most firms also have competitors producing close (though not
perfect) substitutes, so that they are forced, like classical perfect competitors, to
produce and price at a point where they make zero profit.
Advertising enters Chamberlin's theory as one thing that differentiates
products-that is, it affects the degree to which consumers consider one product a substitute for another. Chamberlin gives lip service to the idea that one
way advertising does this is through substantive information, but emphasizes the
alternative approach that advertising is mere psychological manipulation. He
explicitly allows that advertising may work either by information or by
manipulation:
Selling costs are defined as costs incurred in order to alter the position or shape of
the demand curve for a product.... Let us take advertising as typical of these expenditures and inquire how its results are brought about. The explanation may be
related to the two factors of (1) imperfect knowledge and (2) the possibility of al47
tering people's wants by advertising or selling appeal.

Indeed, his exposition of the informative advertising process is quite laudatory:
Buyers often do not know or are but dimly aware of the existence of sellers other
than those with whom they habitually trade or of goods other than those they ha-

bitually consume; they are ill-informed of comparative prices for the same thing
sold by different merchants; they are ignorant of the qualities of goods, in themselves, compared with other goods, and compared with the prices asked. Advertising increases a seller's market by spreading information (or misinformation) on the
basis of which buyers' chices as to the means of satisfying their wants are altered.
... Quality competition, like price competition, is stimulated by the possibility of
informing a large number of potential buyers, through advertising, of quality
changes or of existing attributes of a product of which they were not aware. If the
46.
tion).
47.

Edward Chamberlin, The Theor , of Monopolistic Competition (Harvard 1939) (update of 1933 ediId at 117-18 (emphasis in original).
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information is truthful, wants are more effectively satisfied; if not, they are less effectively satisfied. In either case, the satisfaction of exi ing wants is sought with
different information at the disposal of the buyer, as to the means whereby it may
be done. 48

Chamberlin's view of the second advertising technique--altering tastes-is far
less complimentary:
Advertising affects demands, in the second place, by altering the wants themselves.
• .. [S]eling methods which play upon the buyer's susceptibilities, which use
against him laws of psychology with which he is unfamiliar and therefore against
which he cannot defend himself, which frighten or flatter or disarm him--all of
these have nothing to do with his knowledge. They are not informative; they are
49
manipulative. They create a new scheme of wants by rearranging his motives.

That Chamberlin considers the manipulative element of advertising more,
important than the informative is evident from several things. For one, he lumps
all forms of advertising into the scheme of product differentiation by which
firms acquire partial monopoly power and gouge consumers. 50 For another,
many of his examples of allegedly manipulative advertising are, in fact, informative. For instance, Chamberlin argues that "the merchant located in the outskirts
who advertises urging people to come to him because he is 'out of the high rent
district' is adapting not himself, but his customers. He is giving them less, not
more, convenience, and trying to divert their attention from it."51 Although
Chamberlin classes this as manipulative, the fact that a store can charge lower
prices because it has lower rent costs would seem to be a matter of information,
and a valuable one at that. Another example of Chamberlin's miscategorization
will resonate with the legal reader Chamberlin's argument against trademarks.
Chamberlin devotes an entire appendix to the contention that trademarks are
simply a means of enforcing monopolies, contravening the (then and now) prevailing view that they serve the valuable substantive function of informing con48. Id at 118-19 (emphasis in original).
49. Id at 119-20. In the 1939, but not the 1933, edition, the following footnote is appended to the
end of the cited passage:
Cf. the following 'The buyer's brain is the board upon which the game is played. The faculties
of the brain are the men. The salesman moves or guides these faculties as he would chess men
or checkers on a board. In order to understand the ground upon which your battle must be
fought, and the mental elements which you must combat, persuade, move, push or attract, you
must understand the various faculties of the mind." (W.W. Atkinson, The Pgcbology of Saksmansbo, p. 70.) "In undertaking to psychologize about the conduct of the buyer, let it be understood that we purpose to catalogue the sensations, ideas and feelings animating him and to discover the springs of his action.., we seek merely to give a complete description and explanation of the buyer's conduct and explain how to manipulate it" (H. D. Kitson, The Mind of the
Buyer,p. 8.)
Id at 120 (ellipsis and citations in original).
50. Id at 71-73.
51. Id at125.
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52
sumers about the source (and therefore the quality) of goods.
Furthermore, there are some concrete indications that Chamberlin's theory
entered into the Supreme Court's original distinction of commercial from noncommercial speech in Valentine v Chrestensen.53 That opinion does not cite any
source for its reasoning. Its only citations are to the statute at issue and the procedural history of the case, which suggests that the Court may have been looking to the opinions below for guidance. As noted above, the District Court
found for Chrestensen in his suit over enforcement of a handbill ordinance preventing his advertising; 4 the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, but with a
sharp dissent from Judge Jerome Frank.55 The Supreme Court, in reversing the
Second Circuit, agreed with Judge Frank's dissent.
It is quite likely that Frank was aware of Chamberlin's work. One would expect that as a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Frank would be generally conversant in economic matters. He indeed displayed
such general conversance in his opinions,5 6 but he also gave signs that he was
specifically familiar with Chamberlin's theory. In Standard Brands, Inc v Smidler,
Frank wrote:

The public today is displaying a revived, lively interest in "free enterprise." That
revived interest, one may hope, will not prevent a discriminating consideration of
socially desirable monopolies or partial monopolies, an adequate cognizance of
what, with increasing understanding, many modem economists call "imperfect
57
competition" or "monopolistic competition.

Earlier, in Eastern Wine Coip v Winslow-Warren, Frank had written: "Some
economists have recently aided clear thinking on the subject by dropping the
black-and-white distinction between competition and monopoly and talking of
'monopolistic competition."'5 8 Although Chamberlin is not cited by name,
Frank was obviously at least familiar with the general theory of monopolistic
competition. It should also be noted that both StandardBrands and Eastern Wine
were trademark cases and that in each Frank gave an anti-trademark argument
similar to the one in Chamberlin's aforementioned appendix.5 9 Frank was thus
also familiar with the particular application of monopolistic competition theory
to advertising.
52. Id at 218-22. Chamberlin discusses the prevailing views in his day. For the prevailing views in
our day, see, for example, Kitch and Perlman, IntellectualPropertyand Competition at 170-72 (cited in note 31).
53. 316 US at 54.
54. Id.
55.

Chrestensen v Valentine, 122 F2d 511, 517 (2d Cir 1941).
See, for example, Eastern Wine Corp v Winslow-Varren, Lid, 137 F2d 955 (2d Cir 1943); Standard
Brands, Inc iSmidler, 151 F2d 34, 37-43 (2d Cir 1945) (Frank concurring).
57. 151 F2d at 42 (Frank concurring).
58. 137 F2d at 959 n 7.
59. Compare Standard Brands, 151 F2d at 38-43 (Frank concurring) and Eastern Wine, 137 F2d at
957-60, with Chamberlin, The Theogy of MonopolisticCompetition at 218-22 (cited in note 46).

56.
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It is similarly possible to trace (at least roughly) the economic influences on
the Court in Viinia State Bd of Pharmagy.6o That case invalidated Virginia's ban

on price advertising by pharmacists for prescription drugs. The only source relied on by the Court with respect to the economic effects of the advertising ban
was Presciption Drug Pice Disclosures: Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission,61

which relied for its theory of the economic benefits of advertising on George
Stigler's article The Economics of Informaion.62 Stigler's argument is that price advertisements benefit consumers by reducing the number of visits they have to
make to stores in order to find the lowest prices. Prices are also lowered because
high-priced stores cannot hold on to customers with knowledge of lower prices
elsewhere. Stigler's argument can be seen as a special case of Nelson's, where
the characteristic being advertised is the good's price. At least with respect to
this price characteristic, any good is an information good.
THE APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ADVERTISING
If political candidates are subject to the same classifications as are other
goods, then which type of good a candidate is may affect whether political campaigns are political speech. If candidates are information goods, then one would
expect political advertising to contain substantive messages about candidates'
positions. On the other hand, if candidates are experience goods, then political
advertising is at best fluff, at worst brainwashing or vote buying, and in any
event not speech worthy of First Amendment protection.
A logical look at the nature of politics would suggest that political candidates are information goods. Their positions are defined by particular points on
commonly understood policy spectra, such as, whether certain well-known practices should be legal or illegal, how large the government budget should be, or
how the budget should be divided among familiar priorities. The usual logic of
experience good advertising does not apply to politicians. Since they typically do
not spend their own money on campaigns, they do not stand to lose anything if
voters choose them and later come to dislike them. The one economic study to
apply this classification system to political advertising does, indeed, implicitly
classify politicians as information goods.63
THE ECONOMICS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING LIM1TS
Economic arguments support the legal position that the more candidates
operate like information goods, the less campaign spending should be limited.
60.

425 US 748 (1976).

61. United States Bureau of Consumer Protection (1975).
62. George Stigler, The Economia of Informadion, 69 J Pol Econ 213 (1961). Citations to Stigler in Prscry~iionDrug PriceDisclosursare on pp. 81-84 of the report
63. See Phillip Nelson, PoliicalInformalion, 19J L & Econ 315 (1976).
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Nelson's general model holds that a consumer will buy an information good if
and only if that consumer is inclined to prefer that good's characteristics by his
underlying preferences and if the consumer is informed of the good's characteristics by advertising.64 The number of customers is then the number of "potential customers" who are inclined to prefer the good, multiplied by the fraction of
those customers that encounter sufficient advertising to be informed. 6 This
implies that a product's revenue will be described by a mathematical function of
the form:
R = Q-P-N.I

(1)

where R is revenue, P is price per unit, Q is unit sales per customer, N is the
number of potential customers (that is, those whose preferences would incline
them to buy the product if they were informed of it), and I is the fraction of
potential customers that are informed. 66 In an election context, since a voter can
expend only one vote on a candidate (that is, P Q = 1, with the possible exception of the home city of this journal), this equation would translate to:

R = N.I
(2)
where R is the candidate's vote total. Since a candidate's underlying approval
(indicated by N, the number of voters who are inclined to support him) and the
effects of his advertising (indicated by 1) enter this vote-generating function in a
multiplicative way, they are mathematically complimentary. That is, greater underlying approval adds to the effect of campaign advertising. Other things being
equal, donors' dollars will thus go further for the more approved candidate and
that candidate's donors will have an incentive to give more.
On the other hand, purchasing an experience good requires only that a consumer receive enough advertising messages to be persuaded that the advertiser
would not be wasting his advertising dollar on an inferior product. Any advertiser could potentially meet this criterion for any given consumer, so that any
consumer in the market is a potential customer of any given advertiser. An advertiser's revenue is then given by the product price, multiplied by the average
quantity per consumer, multiplied by the total number of consumers in the market, multiplied by the fraction of consumers reached by the advertising-

64. See
65. See
66. See
given different

Nelson, Advertisig as Information, 82 J Pol Econ at 735 (cited in note 30).
id.
id. The equation given here is of the same form as Nelson's, but some of the variables are
names for ease of exposition.
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R = QP'NI
(3)
where No is the total number of consumers in the market. In a voting context,
one can again make the substitution P-Q = 1, which now yields the simple equation:
R = NI
(4)
That is, votes are simply a fixed multiple of the effect of advertising. Here, there
is no complementarity between advertising and underlying approval. Donors to
the more approved candidate will thus get no more "bang for their buck" and
have no added incentive to donate. There then is no reason to expect that the
candidate with the more approved policy will garner the most donations. 67
One can now see how the legal and economic arguments agree. The legal
argument posits that if political advertising is the sort that tends to contain information, it has stronger status as political speech. It is thus more constitutionally suspect to limit campaign advertising. Economically, if political advertising is
informative, the advertising is complementary with the underlying approval of
the candidate. The candidate that has more underlying support also tends to get
the most donations, and there is less economic sense in limiting campaign expenditures.
CONCLUSION

People naturally fear corruption in politics. An instinctual mistrust arises
when one sees substantial amounts of money changing hands and a politician is
involved. In the context of advertising, this may create an impression that political campaigns are qualitatively different from other sorts of advertising,
demanding unique analytical tools and raising unique legal concerns. Political
advertisements, however, must compete for the public's attention on the same
airwaves and newsprint as advertisements for peanut butter, automobiles, and
insurance. The logical treatment, then, may be to analyze campaign advertising
with the same economic tools that one brings to bear on advertising as a whole.
When one does this, political advertising looks much less nefarious than it
first appears. In the classic framework of information goods and experience
goods, political candidates would seem to be squarely in the former category:
political platforms describe points on well-known policy spectra and a verbal
description can convey all the knowledge a voter needs to have about a candi67.

For a fuller elaboration of the complementarity argument, see Fenn, The Pohby Effects of Campaign

Spending Limifs (cited in note 18).
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date. It is reasonable to expect, then, that campaign advertising will in fact convey that information. Rather than being mere attention getters or some mysterious form of mind control, political advertisements should be expected to convey substantive information about candidates' positions on the issues.
Courts and commentators have already found that this characteristic of information goods has legal implications in some areas, e.g., information goods
are less susceptible to claims of false advertising because a false ad about an
observable characteristic is easily disproven and discounted. Certain themes of
First Amendment law suggest that the economics of advertising should have
some bearing there as well. A standard distinction between speech and conduct
is the presence of a "particularized message," and relevant First Amendment
analyses of commercial and non-commercial speech have long been tied to prevailing views of the economic mechanics of advertising. If the economics of
advertising have any relevance for the First Amendment, the tendency for substantive information in political ads calls for strong First Amendment protection
and limited scope for campaign finance restrictions.
The pure economics of the situation mirror the legal analysis. To the extent
political candidates are information goods, their advertising expenditures will be
complementary to their underlying approval. Donors will thus have greater incentives to give to the more approved candidate, and large amounts of fundraising will only reinforce the "pure democratic" outcome. On the other hand, if
candidates are experience goods, there should be no such correlation between
donations and underlying approval and funding restrictions might be necessary
to preserve majority rule. This crisp parallel between the legal and economic
facets of campaign advertising lends further support to the economics of advertising as an analytical tool for understanding campaign finance. The conclusion
of such an analysis is that campaign spending merits strong First Amendment
protection.

